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Trustee Board Diversity, Governance Mechanisms, Capital Structure and Performance in UK 
Charities 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: We investigate the association among trustee board diversity (TBD), corporate governance (CG), 
capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) using a sample of UK charities. Specifically, we 
investigate the effect of TBD on CS, and ascertain whether CG quality moderates the TBD-CS nexus. 
Additionally, we examine the impact of CS on FP, and ascertain whether the CS-FP nexus is also moderated 
by TBD and CG quality.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: We employ a number of multivariate regression techniques, including 
ordinary least squares, fixed-effects, lagged-effects and two-stage least squares to rigorously analyse the data 
and test the hypotheses.  
Findings: First, we find that trustee board gender diversity has a negative effect on CS, but this relationship 
holds only up to the point of having three women trustees. We find similar, but relatively weak results for the 
presence of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic trustees. Second, we find that the TBD-CS nexus depends on 
the quality of CG with the relationship being stronger in charities with higher frequency of meetings, 
independent CG committee, and larger trustee and audit firm size. Third, we find that CS structure has a 
positive effect on FP, but this is moderated by TBD and CG quality. Our evidence is robust to different 
econometric models that adjust for alternative measures and endogeneities. We interpret our findings within 
the explanations of a theoretical perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS theories. 
 
Originality/value: Existing studies on TBD, CG, CS and FP in charities are rare. Our study distinctively 
attempts to address this empirical lacuna within the extant literature by providing four new insights with 
specific focus on UK charities. First, we provide new evidence on the relationship between TBD and CS. 
Second, we offer new evidence on the moderating effect of CG on the TBD-CS nexus. Third, we provide 
new evidence on the effect of CS on FP.  Finally, we offer new evidence on the moderating effect of TBD 
and CG on the CS-FP nexus. 
 
Keywords: Trustee board diversity, women and ethnic minority trustees, governance mechanisms, capital 
structure and performance, charities, UK 
 
Paper Type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the relationship among trustee diversity (TBD), corporate governance (CG), 
capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with 
specific focus on a sample of UK charities. The non-profit sector is economically vital worldwide. In the UK 
as at 31 March 2017, the number of charities registered was 165,277 with a total yearly income of £70.93bn 
and creating over a million jobs (Charity Commission, 2017). Charities in the UK also continue to receive a 
large amount of donations and grants from the general public/central government to support their services, 
despite severe public sector budget cuts following the recent global financial crisis. Thus, failure of charities 
can lead to significant reputational damage to the sector in particular, but the UK economy in general 
(Boateng et al., 2016). For example, it emerged that “Kids Company”, a large UK charity that collapsed 
recently, received £3 million UK government grant following a ministerial direction despite advice that the 
grant was unlikely to represent value for money for UK tax-payers only in the few weeks preceding its 
failure, and in total, this charity received over £100m of UK tax-payers’ funds. Additionally, charities in 
general are important as they provide a wide range of services to the local and international community, 
including providing services to children and their families, residential housing for the homeless, and free 
services to victims of earthquakes and wars. In spite of the importance of charities to local and the 
international community, CG structures in the charity sector are often overlooked, leading to poor 
accountability and CG, weak financial management and internal controls, and lack of adequate transparency 
(Newton, 2015). The weak monitoring and internal controls usually associated with charities has often led to 
their ultimate collapse, and the recent collapse of the “Kids Company” in the UK is a classic example. The 
UK Public Accounts Committee’s report into the failure of this charity indicates that its insolvency was 
mainly caused by poor CG, CS and FP practices (PACAC, 2016). 
One way to strengthen CG quality in charities is to ensure that more trustees of women and ethnic 
minority backgrounds are appointed to charity boards (Buse et al., 2016; Das & Dey, 2016; Gyapong et al., 
2016; Ntim, 2015). Indeed, recent global debate and public policy, especially in the EU, UK and 
Scandinavian countries has sought to affirmatively increase diversity in corporate boards. It is argued that 
board gender and ethnic diversity can enhance managerial monitoring and board independence by bringing 
diverse ideas, perspectives and knowledge into board decision-making (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter et 
al., 2003, 2010; Delis et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Loukil 
& Yousfi, 2015; Triana et al., 2013). The increased monitoring and independence often associated with 
diverse boards may enhance legitimacy and trustworthiness of the board, and consequently encourage 
stakeholders to provide support to charities, including finance (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Perrault, 2015; 
Terjesen & Sealy, 2016). It is generally accepted that board diversity, CG, CS and FP are interlinked with 
researchers suggesting that boardroom diversity has a significant impact on critical corporate decisions, 
including CG and CS choices (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005). However, there seems to be a lack of empirical 
evidence relating to the impact of board gender and ethnic diversity on CS, and the influence of CS on FP in 
charities. Therefore, in this paper, we seek to make a number of new contributions to prior studies by 
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examining the link among trustee board (i.e., gender and ethnic) diversity (TBD), CG, CS and FP using a 
sample of UK charities. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which TBD drives CS, and ascertain 
whether CG quality moderates the link between TBD and CS. In addition, we examine the effect of charity 
CS on FP, and ascertain whether the charity CS-FP nexus is also contingent on the quality of CG. A 
theoretical perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS theories informs our analysis.  
Theoretically, agency theory (loosely incorporating signalling and perking order predictions) suggests 
that there is often a potential conflict of interest (and related agency costs) between the motives of principals 
(i.e., stakeholders, for example, donors) and agents (i.e., enterprise management, for example charity 
trustees) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1982; Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to Jensen 
(1986), substantial free cash flows in enterprises, such as charities could signal agency problems (costs) to 
principals because of the isk of cash misappropriation by charity trustees. To signal efficiency in the use of 
cash flows, Jensen (1986) suggests that charities can use debt financing as a useful CG mechanism to reduce 
such agency conflicts. This is because debt financing would effectively bond the trustees (a signal of agents’ 
commitment) to operate efficiently in order to be able to pay the interest and the debt (i.e. future cash flows). 
Consequently, the use of high levels of debt may result in reducing agency costs often associated with having 
more free cash flows in the hands of trustees. In the same way, Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jiraporn, Kim, 
Kim and Kitsabunnarat (2012) suggest that the use debt may incentivise managers (trustees) to work harder, 
reduce misappropriation of resources, and make better investment decisions. Therefore, one way by which 
charities can reduce such agency conflict (e.g. the potential for misappropriation of excessive free cash flows 
in the hands of charity trustees) is by using debt financing. 
Second, legitimacy theory indicates that charities gain their right to exist from the broader society. 
Consequently, the goals, norms and aspirations of charities should be aligned with those of the broader 
society (Patten, 1991) in order to attract funds (i.e., donations and government grants) (Deegan, 2002). Third, 
stakeholder theory identifies specific powerful stakeholders within the larger society that a charity may need 
to be accountable to in order to legitimise its operations and gain access to resources (Gray et al., 1995). 
Finally, resource dependence theory suggests that directors (trustees) can influence CS through their 
networks/connections with the providers of finance (Tricker, 2012). Specifically, and in relation to TBD, the 
presence of women and ethnic minority trustees on a charity’s board may help in optimising CS and 
enhancing FP by providing a broader network of external donors (Singh, 2007). 
Given the varied theoretical reasons underlying the relationship among CG, CS and FP, previous studies 
have explored governance and performance within charities (for example, see, Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; 
Berger et al., 1997; Gomez et al., 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Viviani, 2008; Padron et al., 2005; Ranti, 
2013; Sheikh & Wang, 2012; Reed et al., 2000). However, the existing literature suffers from a number of 
limitations. First, previous studies have focused mainly on examining the determinants of CG, CS and FP in 
for-profit firms (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; Gomez et al., 2016; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Sheikh  & Wang, 
2012). Second, despite the theoretical and empirical indications that board gender and ethnic diversity have a 
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significant influence on corporate decisions, including financing (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ntim, 2015), the 
few existing studies examining CS in the not-for-profit sector have largely investigated how general charity 
characteristics, such as size and age, can influence CS (Jegers & Verschueren, 2006; Jegers, 2011). 
Arguably, this limits current understanding of the extent to which TBD can affect CG, CS and FP. Third, the 
few existing studies examining the determinants of CS in not-for-profit organisations have not investigated 
whether firm-level CG quality can moderate the association among TBD, CS and FP. 
Fourth, studies examining the association between CS and FP are equally rare; but also have mainly 
focused on private and for-profit sectors. Additionally, the findings of these studies (in private and for-profit 
sectors) are largely mixed (Bandyopadhyay & Barua, 2016; Booth et al., 2001; Chadha & Sharma, 2015; 
Dawar, 2014; Ebaid, 2009; Kester, 1986; Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Margaritis 
& Psillaki, 2010; Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Sheikh & Wang, 2013). Another 
observable limitation of these studies is that they do not sufficiently consider the possible moderating effect 
of board gender/ethnic diversity and CG on the association between CS and FP. Finally, despite increasing 
theoretical/empirical suggestions that relying on a multi-theoretical perspective can help in explaining the 
association between CG, CS, and FP (Al-Najjar & Hussainey, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Ntim, 2015), 
existing studies are either mainly descriptive (Leuz et al., 2010; Titman & Trueman, 1986) or informed by 
single theoretical perspective (Berger et al., 1997; Jiraporn et al., 2012; Myers, 1984). Together, these 
limitations arguably impede our ability to understand and explain the impact of TBD on charity CG, CS and 
FP. 
Consequently, the current research seeks to address some of the weaknesses of prior research in various 
ways, and thereby extend, as well as offer a couple of new contributions to the prior literature. First, we aim 
to contribute to the extant literature by examining the impact of TBD on CS in SMEs with specific focus on 
UK charities. Second, it contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on why and how charity-
level CG quality can moderate the association between TBD and CS. Third, the study contributes to existing 
research by investigating the effect of CS on FP of charities. Finally, given that TBD, CG mechanisms and 
CS may act either as complements and/or substitutes, we contribute to existing literature by investigating 
whether TBD and CG quality can moderate the association between charity CS and FP. 
The remainder of this study is organised in the following order. Section 2 outlines the TBD, CG and CS 
issues in UK charities. Sections 3 and 4 review the theoretical and empirical literature, respectively. The 
research design is presented in section 5. The empirical findings are discussed in section 6, whilst section 7 
offers a conclusion to the paper. 
2. TBD, CG, CS and regulatory environment of the UK charity sector  
The need to improve CG practices in the UK gained strong momentum in the late 1980s as this period 
was characterised by low transparency, lack of accountability, weak CG structures and poor financial 
management (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Palmer & Randall, 2002). Consequently and since the early 1990s, 
several legislations and reports have been introduced aimed at promoting high standards of CG by enhancing 
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accountability and transparency among UK charities. In 1993, the Charities Act was issued and sought to 
strengthen the crucial issue of reporting and financial management. Articles 43 and 45 of the 1993 Charities 
Act require all registered charities with gross annual income exceeding £10,000 or total expenditure 
exceeding £250,000 to prepare annual reports/accounts and submit them to charity commissioners within ten 
months of the year end. These annual reports/accounts should be professionally audited or independently 
examined. The annual reports/accounts shall fairly present the financial position of a charity and should be 
kept for at least six years of the relevant year end. This can be useful to different groups of stakeholders (e.g., 
government and other donors) in assessing trustees’ management and stewardship of funds (Charity 
Commission and the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2014). The Charities Act was updated in 2006 
and 2011 with the aim of enhancing the independence and objectivity of trustees. For example, Article 80 of 
2011 Charities Act suggests that the Charity Commission has the right to remove any trustee who has been 
adjudged to be bankrupt. In addition, Articles 36 and 185 of the 2006 and 2011 Charities Acts, respectively, 
indicate that trustees should be paid sufficiently in order to attract, retain and encourage them to perform 
their activities effectively. 
In addition to the above recommendations, UK charities are required to comply with CG codes, including 
‘The 2008 Hallmarks of an Effective Charity Guidance’ and the ‘2010 Good Governance Charity Code’. In 
relation to the ‘2008 Hallmarks Guidance’, it was published by the Charities Commission and it has six 
principles, including those relating to trustee board structure and risk management (Charity Commission, 
2008). The Hallmarks recommends that charities should be run by a strong board of trustees, which should 
act in the charity’s best interests, including those of donors and beneficiaries. The guidance fails to indicate 
the exact number of trustees that a board should consist of, but suggests that every board must be of 
sufficient size to perform its activities effectively. With regard to trustee board gender and ethnic diversity, 
the Hallmarks suggests that trustee boards should be sufficiently diverse in several aspects (e.g., age, 
ethnicity, experience, gender, qualifications and skills) in order to improve the effectiveness of the board. 
Additionally, the Hallmarks guidance suggests that charities should review/assess all risks faced by them 
regularly and plan for management of those risks. However, and unlike for profit-companies, the guidance 
does not require charities to have a risk register or establish a separate risk committee. Similarly, the 
Hallmarks did not provide specific guidance relating to maintaining a specific optimal CS, but it 
recommends charities to implement policies that will be aimed at managing their debts, investments and 
reserves in order to maintain long-term sustainable operations. 
In addition to the 2008 Hallmarks Guidance, the Charity Commission issued a specific CG Code for the 
charity sector in 2005, known as “Good Governance: A Code for the Voluntary and Community Sector”. 
This Code was revised in 2010 with the aim of promoting high standards of CG by enhancing accountability 
and transparency in UK charities. The 2010 CG Code sets out best practices for good governance by 
providing six principles that broadly mirror those contained in the 2010 Hallmarks Guidance. Similar to the 
Hallmarks, the 2010 CG Code suggests that trustee boards should be sufficient in size in order to perform 
their duties and activities effectively. The Code also emphasises that charities should review/assess all major 
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risks regularly and should also have in place appropriate policies to manage those risks. Unlike the 
Hallmarks, however, the 2010 CG Code indicates that it is the duty of trustees to pursue sound financial 
management and maintain adequate internal control systems, including complying with all applicable general 
or specific sector regulations and laws. The Code also recommends that trustees should hold regular 
meetings in order to perform their activities effectively. Additionally, the 2010 CG Code promotes trustee 
diversity by recommending that board of trustees should have appropriate mix of skills, experience, gender 
and ethnicity, in order to avoid tokenism and be effective.  
3. Charity TBD, CG, CS and FP theories 
Although corporate and academic interest in CG, CS and FP has increased in recent years (Dawar, 
2014; Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015), there is no comprehensive theoretical framework that can explain the 
relationship among TBD, CG, CS and FP (Calabrese, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; 
Myers, 2001; Rosen & Sappington, 2016; Sheikh & Wang, 2013). One way of addressing this limitation is to 
adopt a multi-theoretical framework (Parker, 2015; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013), and therefore this study 
draws from insights provided by agency, legitimacy, stakeholder, resource dependence, pecking order and 
signalling theories in conducting our analysis.  
For example and briefly, agency theory argues that trustees as agents in charities are typically 
opportunistic and thus, do not always act in the best interests of principals (donors) (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). In this setting, increased leverage usage and the associated capital and interest repayments can be a 
useful way in reducing the divergence of interests between trustees and providers of fund, and that may 
improve charity FP (Jiraporn et al., 2012). However, the usefulness of agency theory in explaining CS has 
been suggested to be impaired because it assumes that managers (trustees) always behave opportunistically, 
but this is often contested because trustees working in charities are often motivated (at least partly) by some 
level of altruistic behaviour than by financial incentives alone (Thomsen, 2014; Elghuweel et al., 2017). 
Resource dependence theory suggests that boards provide an essential link between a charity and the 
powerful stakeholders who provide critical resources needed to be successful (Loukil & Yousfi, 2015; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ntim, 2016). This theory has also been criticised for suggesting that CG practices 
should be pursued in order to mainly advance the strategic interests of organisations (i.e., obtain fund and 
maximise profit), and thus fails to recognise the need for organisations to be accountable and responsible to a 
broader range of stakeholders (Barton & Gordon, 1987; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006).  
Legitimacy theory indicates that there is a communal agreement between an organisation and the wider 
society. Hence, the organisation gains its right to exist from the broader society. Consequently, the goals, 
norms and aspirations of the organisations should be aligned with those of the wider society (Patten, 1991; 
Suchman, 1995). However, legitimacy theory is hindered by a number of weaknesses, including its failure to 
determine the identity of the specific stakeholders of charities, and often prioritising financial stakeholders, 
who are clearly not the main beneficiaries of charitable causes (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).  
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Additionally, stakeholder theory presents a charity as consisting of a nexus of explicit and implicit 
contracts among stakeholders, with each group providing the charity with the critical resources required, and 
in exchange, expect their interests to be satisfied (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Elmagrhi et al., 2016, 2017). For 
example, donors provide charities with finance and they require their funds to be used only for the purposes 
for which they have been given. Stakeholder theory has, however, been criticised for its failure to outline 
how to align the often conflicting interests of different groups of stakeholders (Gray et al., 1995; Sternberg, 
1997). 
With respect to CS, pecking order theory suggests that organisations generally prefer internal to external 
sources of finance (Gomez et al., 2016; Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In this case, external sources, 
such as debt will be used only if internal sources have been exhausted. Therefore, according to pecking order 
theory, organisations which are profitable and generate sufficient cash flows are less likely to use debt in 
their CS because they will be able to finance their activities using internal funds. Finally, signalling theory 
suggests that outsiders (i.e., providers of finance) may rely on an organisation external actions’ in order to 
minimise information asymmetry problems. In particular, signalling theory assumes that the CS of a charity 
may act as a signal to outsiders about the organisation’s future financial prospects (Michaelas et al., 1999; 
Ross, 1977). Thus, a charity’s decision to issue more debt may be perceived by outsiders as a signal by 
trustees that their charity may have bright future prospects.  
 As there are clear limitations with respect to each individual theoretical perspective and given that this 
study seeks to examine four related issues (i.e., the impact of TBD on CS; the moderating effect of CG 
quality on the TBD-CS nexus; the relationship between CS and FP; and the moderating effect of TBD and 
CG quality on the CS-FP nexus), this study adopts a multi-theoretical approach. 
4. Charity TBD, CG, CS and FP: Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
4.1 Charity TBD and CS 
TBD has been suggested to play an important function in terms of alleviating different types of agency 
problems and ensuring that organisations operate efficiently and competitively (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017). In particular, it has been suggested that TBD (gender 
and ethnic diversity) can perform a vital role in enhancing board effectiveness by increasing board 
independence from management and also by bringing diverse ideas, perspectives, knowledge and experience 
to the board (Buse et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Das & Dey, 2016; Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Loukil & 
Yousfi, 2015). Additionally, Delis et al. (2016), Gyapong et al. (2016) and Ntim (2015) argue that 
organisations with more women and ethnic minorities on their boards may be better place to improve FP by 
monitoring managers more closely. This implies that charities with gender/ethnically diverse boards may not 
need to employ higher levels of leverage in order to monitor and encourage trustees to act in line with 
stakeholders’ interests. Further, and from legitimisation perspective, board diversity can enhance 
organisation’s reputation/image by increasing public accountability and confidence (Loukil & Yousfi, 2015; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Sila et al., 2016; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016). In contrast, TBD can increase 
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managers’ power and influence over board decisions by appointing a few women and ethnic minorities 
mainly for symbolic reasons (Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016). In this case, charities with a 
token gender/ethnic representation may need to use more debt in order to reduce opportunistic behaviour of 
managers that may arise from potential poor managerial monitoring.  
Existing empirical studies examining the effect of TBD on CS are rare and therefore, offer opportunities 
to make original contribution to the extant literature. However, prior studies suggest that TBD (gender and 
ethnic diversity) impacts positively on FP (e.g., Borghesi et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Delis et al., 2016; 
Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015), voluntary CG disclosure 
(Al-Bassam et al., 2016; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Abdulrahman et al., 2017; Elamer et al., 2017), audit quality 
(Gul et al., 2008), board monitoring (Triana et al., 2013), board meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), 
dividend payout (Byoun et al., 2013), risk disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013) and social responsibility (Barako & 
Brown, 2008; Brammer et al., 2007; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Haque & Ntim, 2017), but negatively on 
executive pay (Gregory‐Smith et al. 2014; Newton, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015, 2017; Perryman et al., 2016) and 
earnings management (Elghuweel et al., 2017). Observably, none of these studies relate to the charity sector 
and therefore, highlighting the lack of evidence. However, and to the extent that firms with more diverse 
boards have higher FP, but lower executive pay than firms with less diverse boards, we expect charities with 
diverse boards to monitor managers more closely and therefore, a limited use of debt as external governance 
mechanism. Within the European charity context in general, and UK in particular, there is a strong public 
policy commitment to improve charity governance by positively encouraging greater participation of women 
and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups in senior management teams. In particular, principle 
3 of the 2010 Code of Good Governance for the Sector recommends that that trustee boards should be 
sufficiently diverse in a number of aspects, such as age, gender, faith, qualifications and ethnicity, in order to 
improve board effectiveness (Charity Commission, 2010), and thus TBD can be viewed as a positive 
development. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1. There is a negative association between TBD and CS. 
4.2 The moderating effect of CG quality on the TBD-CS nexus 
As explained earlier, TBD may improve board monitoring and board independence by bringing 
different perspectives, skills, experience and ideas to the board (Carter et al., 2003; Triana et al., 2013), 
which can improve decisions relating to CS. However, the ability of trustees to perform their role effectively 
(i.e., optimising CS) may be contingent on the quality of CG (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Hussainey & Aljifri, 
2012). For example, larger boards are often associated with diversity in gender, age, ethnicity, knowledge 
and skills. This can help improve board independence, and thereby have a positive effect on CS (Al-Najjar & 
Hussainey, 2011; Berger et al., 1997). By contrast, others (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) suggest that 
increased communication, co-ordination and free-riding problems usually associated with larger boards 
imply that they are more likely to be controlled by powerful managers. Thus, in firms with larger boards, 
higher levels of leverage may be employed as an extra governance mechanism aimed at aligning the interest 
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of agents and principals (Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; Jensen, 1986). Similarly, stronger managerial 
monitoring often associated with frequent board meetings can enhance managerial monitoring (Vafeas, 
1999), and hence impact positively on CS. By contrast, regular board meetings may reduce the amount of 
time that directors (trustees) may have to perform their duties effectively (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992), and that 
can impact negatively on organisation CS. Additionally, charities with separate CG committees are more 
likely to use less debt compared with their counterparts that do not establish a separate compliance and risk 
committee. This is because strong governance associated with having independent CG committees (Ntim et 
al., 2012a, b) may act as a substitute for external managerial monitoring arising from debt usage. Finally, 
firms audited by large audit firms (e.g., Big-4) are expected to be associated with less agency and 
information asymmetry problems (DeAngelo, 1981), and thus a reduced incentive for managers to use debt 
because of higher agency costs associated with debt (Myers, 1984). In contrast, hiring large audit firms can 
signal to the stakeholders (i.e., donors) that managers are committed to high levels of good governance and 
transparency (Titman & Trueman, 1986) and that may encourage funders to provide more finance in the 
form of debt to charities. Empirically, there is an acute lack of studies examining the moderating effect of 
CG on the TBD-CS nexus generally, but specifically in not-for-profit organisations, and thus this study seeks 
to contribute to the extant literature by examining such an association, for the first time, in the charity sector. 
Given that CG structure can moderate the association between trustee board diversity and CS, our second 
hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
H2. CG quality moderates the association between TBD and CS, with the association being stronger 
(weaker) in charities with strong (weak) CG mechanisms. 
4.3 Charity CS and FP link 
The separation of ownership from control creates agency problems, since agents (trustees) may have 
different interests from those of principals (stakeholders) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Nasr & Ntim, 2017). 
Agency theory suggests that the use of leverage in CS can help in mitigating agency costs by aligning the 
interests of agents with those of principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), which can impact 
positively on FP (Dawar, 2014; Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015). Similarly, signalling theory suggests that using 
more debt in CS may signal to outsiders (i.e., donors) that a charity has bright future financial prospects, 
which can also improve charity’s FP. In contrast, pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
suggests that charities, which are profitable and generate sufficient cash flows, are less likely to use debt in 
their CS because they will prefer using relatively cheaper internal sources of funds (i.e., retained earnings). 
Consequently, negative link could be predicted between debt usage and charity’s FP. 
The findings of extensive prior studies on the association between CS and FP are generally conflicting 
(Bandyopadhyay & Barua, 2016; Booth et al., 2001; Chadha & Sharma, 2015; Dawar, 2014; Ebaid, 2009; 
Kester, 1986; Krishnan & Moyer, 1997; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Phillips & 
Sipahioglu, 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Sheikh & Wang, 2013). Noticeably, these studies have been 
conducted exclusively within for-profit contexts, and therefore offer genuine opportunities to contribute to 
the not-for-profit sector. For instance, and in line with the results of prior research (Booth et al., 2001; 
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Dawar, 2014; Kester, 1986; Sheikh & Wang, 2013; Rajan & Zingales, 1995), Chadha and Sharma (2015) 
report a negative association between CS and FP using a sample of 442 Indian listed firms. By contrast, 
Kyereboah-Coleman (2007), and Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) find a positive association between CS and 
FP. Some prior studies, however, report no significant link between CS and FP (Phillips & Sipahioglu, 2004; 
Krishnan & Moyer, 2007; Ebaid, 2009). A major limitation of prior studies examining the association 
between CS and FP is that they mainly control for general firm characteristics (i.e., firm age and growth) 
without controlling for CG mechanisms that may influence the CS-FP nexus. Thus, we seek to extend the 
literature further by taking into account a comprehensive number of CG variables (e.g., trustee board size 
and trustee board meeting) when examining the relationship between CS and FP. Notwithstanding the mixed 
findings of past studies on the CS-FP nexus, however, our third hypothesis to be tested is that: 
H3. There is a positive association between CS and FP.  
4.4 The moderating effect of TBD and CG quality on the CS-FP nexus 
As previously explained, prior empirical studies have focused on examining the direct link between CS 
and FP. However, the ability of firms with optimal CS to maximise FP may be contingent on CG quality and 
TBD. TBD, for example, may enhance charity FP by providing better linkages with the external environment 
(Delis et al., 2016; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, TBD may increase conflict among board members 
(Estelyi & Nisar, 2016; Jackson et al., 2003) and that can impact negatively on the ability of boards to make 
optimal decisions regarding CS and thus charity’s FP.  
CG quality may also moderate the link between charity CS and FP. For example, larger boards may 
enjoy more diversity in skills, experience and knowledge compared with smaller boards, and that may 
enhance their capacity to monitor managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). In 
contrast, larger boards are associated with more communication and coordination problems (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006; Yermack, 1996), which can impact negatively on FP. The presence of CG committees can 
enhance charity accountability and legitimacy by increasing managerial monitoring and ensuring compliance 
with good CG practices (Harrison, 1987; Ntim et al., 2012 a, b), and thereby impact positively on FP. Also 
and on the one hand, regular attendance of board meetings is considered to be a sign of a diligent trustee 
(Conger et al., 1998; Sonnenfeld, 2002), and thus, frequent board meeting can enhance charity FP. On the 
other hand, frequent meetings may impact negatively on FP, because it can increase agency costs in the form 
of travelling and meetings costs (Vafeas, 1999). Finally, the use of large audit firms can signal managerial 
commitment to good governance and transparency (DeAngelo, 1981; Titman & Trueman, 1986), which can 
impact positively on charity’s FP. Empirically, existing studies have not examined the moderating effect of 
CG and TBD on the association between CS and FP (even within for-profit firms), and thus, our study aims 
to extend, as well as contribute to the extant literature by examining the moderating effect of TBD and CG 
quality on the CS-FP nexus in the charity sector. Given that CG quality and TBD may moderate the 
relationship between CS and charities’ FP, the last hypothesis is: 
H4: TBD/CG quality moderates the association between CS and FP, with the association being stronger 
(weaker) in charities with more (less) women/ethnic trustees on the board. 
Page 10 of 36Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate G
overnance
11 
 
5. Research design  
 
5.1 Sample selection and data sources 
Three criteria were set to select the final sample: (i) the annual published accounts of the selected 
charities needed to be available/accessible for the years from 2010 to 2014; (ii) a charity’s financial and CG 
data must be available for all years from 2010 to 2014; and (iii) availability of CS data for years from 2010 
to 2014. A number of reasons encouraged the use of these criteria. First, this study limits its sample to 
charities with consecutive-years data available, because CG, financial and CS data were manually collected, 
which is well documented to be a highly labour intensive activity (Ntim et al., 2013). Second, and in line 
with past studies (Newton, 2015; Ntim, 2015; Rosen & Sappington, 2016), these criteria helped to satisfy the 
requirement of a balanced panel analysis. Third, combining time-series and cross-sectional data helps in 
determining whether any observed cross-sectional relationship among TBD, CG mechanisms, CS, and FP 
also holds over time. Further, by combining time series and cross-sectional properties, balanced panel data 
has the ability to increase the degrees of freedom and thus reduce econometric and statistical problems, such 
as multi-collinearities among the variables employed. Fourth, the financial year of 2010 was the first year 
when data collection started because in this year the Code of Good Governance for Voluntary and 
Community Sector was issued. The financial year of 2014 is the last year for which data was available to be 
collected from the data sources. 
[Insert Table 1] 
The study is based on the biggest 100 registered UK charities using total annual income as at 31 March 
2014. Charities have been classified based on the classification provided by the Charities Aid Foundation to 
include five categories: (i) disability; (ii) health; (iii) education; (iv) poverty; and (v) others (see Table 1). 
Due to collecting the data manually, which is considered as a highly labour intensive activity, coupled with 
the extensive nature of TBD, CG, CS, and financial data required, we restricted our final balanced sample to 
50 charities from 2010 to 2014 (i.e., resulting in a sample of 250 observations). Indeed, Table 1 shows the 
characteristics of 30 of the charities studied in terms of their (i) name, (ii) type of charity, (iii) total income, 
(iv) total assets, (v) total debt and (vi) capital expenditure. We collected our data manually from the annual 
published accounts of the examined sample. Those annual accounts were downloaded from charities 
websites and FAME database. 
 
5.2 Definition of variables and model specification 
Table 2 summarises all the main types of variables used in conducting our empirical analyses. To test 
H1 (i.e., to answer our first central research question: the effect of TBD on CS), we use three main types of 
variables. First, and following prior studies (Calabrese, 2011; Rosen & Sappington, 2016; Sheikh & Wang, 
2012), the ratios of long-term debt, short-term debt and total debt to total assets are our main dependent 
variables (CS). Second, our main independent variables are trustee board gender (TGD) and ethnic (TED) 
diversity and they are measured following prior studies (Gyapong et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014) using: (i) the 
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percentage of women/ethnic minorities on the trustee board; and (ii) a dichotomous variable of presence (1) 
or absence of (0) of women and ethnic minorities on charity boards. Finally, and in order to address possible 
omitted variables bias (Gujarati 2003), we added a number of control variables that may affect CS. In 
particular, we controlled for CG mechanisms (i.e., board size, audit firm size, the CG committee, and board 
meetings) and charity characteristics (i.e., liquidity, capital expenditure, industry and year dummies). 
Assuming that all the hypothesised associations are linear, our base ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
model to be estimated is specified as follows: 
           itit
i
iitit CONTSTBDCS εββα +++= ∑
=
8
1
10                                                         
(1) 
Where: CS is the main dependent variable; TBD is our main independent trustee board gender/ethnic 
diversity variable; and CONTS refers to control variables, including trustee board size (TSE), audit firm size 
(AFS), the presence of independent CG committee (PCGC), and frequency of trustee board meetings (TMs). 
[Insert Table 2] 
To test H2 (i.e., to answer our supplementary research question: whether CG quality can moderate the 
association between TBD and CS), we divide study’s variables into four groups. First, our main dependent 
variable is total debt (TD) and is broadly defined to include both long-term (LTD) and short-term (STD) debt. 
Second, our main independent variable is trustee board gender/ethnic diversity (TBD). Third, and to test for 
the moderating impact of CG quality on the TBD-CS nexus, we generate an interaction variable between 
each CG quality mechanism and TBD (TBD*TSE, TBD*AFS, TBD*PCGC, and TBD*TMs). Finally, we 
control for the same variables employed in Model 1. 
To test H3 (i.e., to answer our second central research question: the effect of CS on charity FP) we use 
three main types of variables. First, we classify our variables into three main groups. First, our main 
independent variable (CS) is total debt (TD) and is broadly defined to include both long-term (LTD) and 
short-term (STD) debt. Second, our main dependent variable is charity FP, as measured by return on assets 
(ROA). Finally, we control for the same variables employed in the first and second models. Assuming that all 
the associations are linear, the econometric model to specifically test H3 is structured as follows: 
itit
i
iitit CONTSCSROA εββα +++= ∑
=
8
1
10                                                                     (2) 
To test H4 (i.e., to answer our supplementary research question: whether TBD and CG quality can 
moderate the CS-FP nexus), we divide study’s variables into four groups. First, our main dependent variable 
(FP) is return on assets (ROA). Second, our main independent variable (CS) is total debt (TD). Third, and to 
test for the moderating impact of TBD and CG quality on the CS-FP nexus, we create an interaction variable 
among firm-level CG quality, TBD and TD (e.g., TD*TBD, TD*TSE, TD*AFS, and TD*PCGC). Finally, we 
control for the same variables utilised previously in Model 2. 
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6. Empirical findings 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation analyses 
Table 3 reports the summary descriptive statistics of our main dependent, independent and control 
variables over the period investigated (2010-2014), respectively. Overall, the Table shows wide spread for all 
variables under examination. For example, and consistent with Calabrese (2011), and Sheikh and Wang 
(2012), total debt (TD) ranges from 96.10% to 1.10% with a mean of 30.27%. The mean of trustee board 
gender diversity (TGD) indicates that 30.07% of all trustees are women, implying that UK trustee boards are 
dominated by men (70%). Similarly, the mean of trustee board ethnic diversity (TED) indicates that only 
4.24% of all trustees are non-whites, suggesting that, on average, the boards of sampled UK charities are 
dominated by white trustees (96%), who are mainly white men (70%). In relation to return on assets (ROA), 
it ranges between a minimum of -34.29% to a maximum of 97.72%, with a mean of 61.67%, implying that 
the average UK trustee is profitable (i.e., have surplus). The mean value of trustee board size (TSE) is 13.69 
members, ranging from 5 to 30 members. Trustee board meetings (TMs) ranges between a minimum of 2 
meetings to a maximum of 14 annual meetings, with a mean of 5.13 annual board meetings. With respect to 
the other remaining variables, including AFS, PCGC, LIQ and CEX, all show wide variation, indicating that 
there is adequate variation in our variables. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for all independent, dependent and control variables included in 
our regression analysis in order to identify any potential multicollinearity problems. As a robustness check, 
we report both the parametric and non-parametric coefficients for Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation 
coefficients, respectively. Observably, the direction and of both coefficients are essentially the same; 
suggesting that any remaining normality problems may not be statistically harmful. Additionally, both the 
Pearson and Spearman coefficients indicate that the levels of correlation among all variables are somewhat 
low, suggesting that there are no serious multicollinearity problems among the variables included in our 
study. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 (focusing on Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients) shows statistically strong links 
among TD, TBD and ROA. For example, the evidence that return on assets (ROA) is positively and 
significantly associated with TD is consistent with our predictions and the findings of Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) and Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) for publicly listed firms. 
 
6.2 Multivariate regression analyses 
 
6.2.1 The empirical findings of the effect of TBD on CS 
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First, to answer our first research question (i.e.,  the effect of TBD on CS), Table 5 presents the 
empirical findings of the impact of trustee board gender (TGD)/ethnic (TED) diversity on CS. Specifically, 
the table contains results relating to the effect of TGD and TED on long-term (LTD), short-term (STD) and 
total debt (TD), respectively. Models 1, 2 and 3 of Table 5 suggest that TGD is negatively associated with 
CS, and thereby providing empirical support for H1. The negative TGD-CS nexus is consistent with the 
prediction that gender-diverse boards may provide better monitoring over management by bringing diverse 
ideas, perspectives, knowledge and experience to the board (Buse et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2003; Estelyi & 
Nisar, 2016; Loukil & Yousfi, 2016; Triana et al., 2013), which impact negatively on the charity debt level 
(CS). Empirically, the negative link between TGD and CS is empirically supportive of the results of previous 
studies (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Gyapong et al., 2016; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen et 
al., 2015), which suggest that gender-diverse boards are associated with better monitoring over management, 
and thereby reducing agency problems that are often associated with managers having access to large free 
cash flows.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Models 5 to 7 of Table 5 also indicate that TED is insignificantly associated with short-term and total 
debt, which does not lend support to H1. Evidence of insignificant influence of TED in the UK charity 
boardrooms is largely consistent with their extremely low representation (4.24%, see Table 3), suggesting 
that ethnic minorities have less influence over boards’ decisions, including CS (Carter et al., 2010). This also 
offers empirical support for the predictions of token status theory, which suggests charities may appoint a 
few ethnic minorities to their boards simply for symbolic reasons (i.e., representing disadvantaged groups) 
rather than for substantive ones (e.g., seeking their views in major charity decisions). Model 5 of Table 5 
also suggests that TED is positively and significantly associated with CS, implying that H1 is not empirically 
supported. The evidence is consistent with the expectations that ethnic diversity can increase managers’ 
power and influence over board decisions by appointing few ethnic minorities mainly for symbolic reasons 
(Gyapong et al., 2016). 
Second, to answer our second research question (i.e., the moderating effect of CG quality on the TBD-
CS nexus), the empirical findings relating to investigating the potential moderating effect of CG quality (i.e. 
TSE, AFS, PCGC and TMs) on the TBD-CS nexus are presented in Table 5. In particular, Models 4 and 8 of 
Table 5 report results relating to the moderating effect of CG quality on the relationships among trustee 
board gender diversity (TGD), ethnic diversity (TED) and total debt (TD). All control variables included in 
Models 1-3 and 5-7 are included in Models 4 and 8 of Table 5. The coefficient of TGD on TD in Model 4 is 
negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient of TED on TD is statistically significant and 
positive. Crucially, it is clearly observable from our results that the TBD-CS nexus has noticeably improved. 
The result suggests that CG significantly moderates the TBD-CS nexus. For instance, the link between TED 
and TD has improved from 0.131 in Model 7 of Table 5 to 3.866 in Model 8 of the same Table. The results, 
therefore, provide empirical support for H2 that CG quality moderates the association between TBD and CS, 
with the association being stronger in charities with good CG practices. 
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With respect to the interaction variables, the evidence reported in Models 4 and 8 of Table 5 generally 
provide evidence of a moderating effect of CG quality on the association between TBD and TD, which is 
largely consistent with our hypotheses. To be specific, the statistically positive effect of TGD*TSE, 
TGD*AFS and TGD*TMs on TD in Model 4 is empirically supportive of H2, whereas the statistically 
insignificant effect of TGD*PCGC on TD in Model 4 does not provide support to H2. The insignificant 
effect of PCGC on the association between TGD and TD may not be surprising, because only 28% of the 
sampled charities have a separate independent CG committee, and thus resulting in small cross-sectional 
variations of the PCGC among the examined charities. Additionally, the coefficient of TED*TSE on TD in 
Model 8 of Table 5 is statistically significant and negative providing support for the prediction that larger 
boards are associated with greater diversity in knowledge, experience and skills, and that may help reduce 
information asymmetry by improving board independence, and thus impact negatively on CS (Al-Najjar & 
Hussainey, 2011; Berger et al., 1997). However, the statistically insignificant effect of TED*AFS, 
TED*PCGC and TED*TMs on TD in Model 8 of Table 5 does not provide support for H2. Overall, the 
evidence is that the interacted variables (CG quality) have helped in improving the magnitude of TD and this 
is an indication that CG quality has a moderating effect on the link between TBD and CS, with the 
association being stronger in charities with good CG practices. 
6.2.2 The empirical findings of the effect of charity CS on FP 
Third, to answer our third research question (i.e., the effect of CS on FP), the empirical findings of the 
CS along with the control variables on charity FP are reported in Table 6. In particular, Table 6 contains the 
results for three models relating to LTD (Model 1), STD (Model 2) and TD (Model 3). The results generally 
suggest that CS (LTD, STD and TD) is positively and significantly linked with charity FP (ROA), implying 
that H3 is empirically supported. The positive effect of CS on charity FP is consistent with the prediction that 
the use of leverage in CS can help in mitigating agency costs by aligning the interests of agents (trustees) 
with those of principals (donors) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), and thereby having a positive 
impact on FP (Dawar, 2014; Yazdanfar & Ohman, 2015). Additionally, using more debt in CS may signal to 
outsiders (i.e., funders) that a charity has bright future financial prospects and that can improve charity’s FP. 
Empirically, our evidence offers support for the results of past research (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; 
Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010), which also reported a positive and significant association between CS and FP, 
albeit in for-profit firms.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Finally, to answer our fourth research question (i.e., the moderating effect of TBD and CG quality on 
the CS-FP nexus), the empirical findings relating to investigating the potential moderating effect of TBD and 
CG quality (i.e., TSE, AFS, PCGC and TMs) on the CS-FP nexus are reported in Models 4 and 5 of Table 6. 
All control variables included in Models 1 to 3 are included in Models 4 and 5 of Table 6. The coefficients of 
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TD on ROA in Models 4 and 5 are, respectively, positive and statistically significant. Crucially, it is clearly 
observable from our results presented in Models 4 and 5 that the CS-FP nexus has noticeably improved, 
implying that TBD and CG quality moderate the association between CS and charity FP. For example, the 
link between TD and ROA has increased from 0.962 in Model 3 to 1.709 in Model 4 of Table 6. Similarly, 
the link between TD and ROA has increased from 0.962 in Model 3 to 1.732 in Model 5 of Table 6. The 
result indicates that TBD and CG significantly moderates the association between CS and charity FP, with 
the association being stronger in charities with diverse boards and good CG practices. 
With respect to the interaction variables, the results provided in Models 4 and 5 of Table 6 generally 
provide evidence of a moderating effect of CG structure and TBD on the association between CS and FP, 
which is largely consistent with our predictions. For example, the coefficients of TD*TSE and TD*AFS on 
ROA in Model 4 of Table 6 are statistically significant, providing support for H4. However, the coefficients 
of TD*TGD, TD*PCGC and TD*TMs on ROA in Model 4 of Table 6 are statistically insignificant, which 
does not provide support for H4. Similarly, the statistically significant and negative effect of TD*TED, 
TD*TSE and TD*AFS on ROA in Model 5 of Table 6 provides support for H4, whereas the statistically 
insignificant effect of TD*PCGC and TD*TMs on ROA in Model 5 of Table 6 does not provide support for 
H4. Overall, the interacted variables seem to have helped towards improving the magnitude of the 
coefficients and this suggests that diverse trustee boards and strong CG structures moderate the association 
between CS and FP, with the association being stronger in charities with diverse trustee boards and good CG 
practices. 
6.3 Additional Analysis 
Recent global debate and public policy, especially in the EU, UK and Scandinavian countries have 
sought to positively improve the representation of women and BAME groups on corporate boards (e.g., 
Gyapong et al., 2016). However, whilst it is ethically, morally and socially appropriate to include more 
women and ethnic minorities on corporate boards, such affirmative action measures can arguably be 
sustainable if their presence also improves board decision-making and FP. There is, however, no theoretical 
or empirical evidence on what is the optimal number of women and BAME groups that should be 
represented on charity boards. For example, the EU sets a 25% target of women directors for all large listed 
firms, whilst the target is 50% in Norway.   Therefore, we seek to inform public debate by examining 
whether increasing the number of women and ethnic minority (e.g., from 1 to 7 or more) trustees affects CS. 
To answer this question, we adopt the critical mass theory and token status theory (Gyapong et al., 2016; 
Kanter, 1977; Schwab et al., 2016). These two theories suggest that gender and ethnic diversity may have a 
significant effect on board’s decisions when there is a critical mass. We follow Gyapong et al. (2016), Liu et 
al. (2014) and Schwab et al. (2016) and create seven dummy variables to represent the level of trustee board 
gender/ethnic diversity. We replaced “TGD and TED” in Models 3 and 7 of Table 5 with our women/ethnic 
minority trustee dummies (D1_TG/ED to D7_TG/ED) (i.e., with average trustee board size of 13 members, 7 
women on a board is the critical point at which the average board of trustees in our sample will be clearly 
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dominated by women (i.e., women are in the majority). In relation to TGD, the results presented in Models 1 
to 7 of Table 7 suggest that increasing the number of women trustees to a certain level has a significant effect 
on CS. Specifically, the results indicate that trustee boards with one, two and three women (D1_TGD, 
D2_TGD and D3_TGD) are associated with significantly low debt usage. However, the decrease in TD is 
lower in trustee boards with four or more women. This implies that increasing the number of women on 
trustee board to a certain point (up to 3, which represents about 25% of board members) may enhance board 
decision. However, having four or more women on trustee boards appears to increase conflicts among board 
members, which may impact negatively on boardroom decision-making, CS and FP. 
[Insert Table 7] 
[Insert Table 8] 
To further investigate the impact of increasing the number of women on CS and following Delis et al. 
(2016), our sample is divided into two groups: (i) charities with high percentage of women (charities having 
a TGD value higher than the mean value); and (ii) charities with low percentage of women (charities having 
a TGD value lower than the mean v lue). The results are reported in Table 8 under columns 9 and 10. 
Overall, the results suggest that charities with less gender diversity tend to use lower levels of debt compared 
to those with more gender diverse boards, a finding which is largely consistent with indications of our 
critical mass and token status theories and analyses. In relation to TED, the results presented in Models 1 to 7 
of Table 7 suggest that there is no association between increasing the number of non-white trustees on 
charities boards. The insignificant effect of TED (D1_TED to D7_TED) on CS may be due to their extremely 
low representation (4.24%, see Table 3) and this suggests that ethnic minorities have less influence over 
boards’ decisions, including CS, evidence which is again largely consistent with predictions of token status 
theory. Due to the insignificant effect TED (D1_TED to D7_TED) on CS, we have not divided our sample 
into charities with low and high percentage of non-white trustees.  
6.4 Robustness Analysis  
  We carried out several additional tests to check the robustness of our results. With reference to the 
effect of TBD on CS, we run four different tests: (i) lagged structure models; (ii) fixed-effects; (iii) two-stage 
least square (2SLS); and (iv) Heckman selection model. First, to control for potential endogeneities that may 
arise from simultaneous associations between TBD and CS, a lagged effect model has been estimated, 
whereby this year’s CS is influenced by past year’s TBD and control variables. The findings reported in 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 9 suggest that the findings are fairly robust to possible endogeneity issues that 
might emerge from simultaneous relationship between TBD and CS. Second, we seek to address concerns 
that CS might be influenced by unobserved charity-level characteristics. Models 3 and 7 of Table 5 are re-
estimated by including dummies that represent the examined charities and the results are reported in 
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 9. Overall, the results remain generally the same, suggesting that our results are 
not affected by endogeneity problems that may be associated with unobserved charity-level characteristics.  
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[Insert Table 9] 
Third, to address concerns associated with possible omitted variable bias and following past studies 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003, 2010), a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (DWH) was conducted to 
investigate whether there is any endogenous link between TBD and CS. We re-estimated Models 3 and 7 of 
Table 5 using DWH and the test fails to accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, indicating that the 
2SLS may be more appropriate than OLS regression. In the first stage, TBD is expected to be influenced by 
the eight control variables. In stage two, the predicted values of TBD is used as instrument to re-estimate our 
models. Overall, after comparing the results of 2SLS with the main OLS results, the findings reported in 
Column 6 and 7 of Table 9 remain relatively similar to those reported previously in Table 5, indicating that 
the findings of the study remained fairly robust to using 2SLS. 
Fourth and according to Gyapong et al. (2016), self-selection bias may be introduced into a study like 
this in a number of ways. For example, qualified women and BAME trustees are generally in short supply. 
This means that the few qualified women and BAME trustees will have the option to join the boards of 
charities of their choice, and thereby resulting in a situation whereby qualified women and BAME trustees 
self-select themselves to join boards of charities with good CG practices and higher performance. Similarly, 
some charities may choose (e.g., for ethical, financial, moral and social reasons) to deliberately pursue a 
policy of appointing more women and BAME trustees, and thereby making their presence on the boards of 
their charities a non-random occurrence. Further and as previously explained, by restricting our sample only 
to charities with the full five-year data required, survivorship biased can be introduced, and thereby 
potentially biasing the sample selection process. The availability of any of these conditions may introduce 
self-selection bias into our regression analyses, and consequently impact negatively on the reliability of our 
findings. 
As a result and following prior studies (Gyapong et al., 2016; Hoechle et al., 2012; Peel & Makepeace, 
2012), we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to address potential self-selection bias that may be 
inherent in our findings. In stage one of Heckman model, we employed dummies as dependent variables 
(D_TGD and D_TED) to analyse the decision to appoint (1) or not to appoint (0) a female/ethnic minority 
trustee. We identify independent variable that may influence charities’ decision to appoint or not to appoint 
women/ethnic minority trustees. Previous studies (Gyapong et al., 2016; Hillman et al., 2007) suggest that 
charities in industries with many women/ethnic minority trustees are expected to appoint more women/ethnic 
minority trustees. We, therefore, use women/ethnic minority ratio (TGD_Ratio and TED_Ratio) as a factor 
that may influence charities’ decision to appoint women/ethnic monitory trustees. We follow Gyapong et al. 
(2016) and Liu et al. (2014) and measure women and ethnic minority ratio as the total number of 
women/non-white trustees in an industry minus the total number of women/non-white trustees in that charity, 
all divided by the total number of trustees in that industry minus the total number of trustees in that charity. 
We employ TGD_Ratio and TED_Ratio as determinants of charities’ decision to appoint or not to appoint a 
women/ethnic minority trustee in the first stage of Heckman model. We also include all the control variables 
included in our previous models.  
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In the second stage, we calculate Lambda and include it in our regression model to control for self-
selection bias. The results reported in Models 8 and 10 of Table 10 indicate that Lambda (for both gender 
and ethnicity) has a positive and significant coefficient. However, trustee board gender diversity (TGD) 
remains positive and significantly related to TD, whereas trustee ethnic diversity (TED) still shows a positive 
and insignificant association with TD even after controlling for sample selection bias.     
In terms of the association between CS and charity FP, three different robustness tests have been 
conducted: (i) lagged-effects; (ii) fixed-effects; and (iii) 2SLS. First, to address endogeneity concerns that 
may arise from simultaneous associations between CS and charity FP, a lagged effect model has been 
estimated, whereby this year’s FP is influenced by the past year’s CS and control measures. The findings 
reported in Model 1 of Table 10 remain relatively similar to those reported previously in Table 5, indicating 
that the findings of the study remained fairly robust using lagged structure model. Second, this study also 
attempts to control for concerns that CS might be influenced by unobserved charity-level hetereoscedasticity 
by estimating fixed-effects model. We re-estimated Model 3 in Table 5 by including dummies to represent 
sampled charities and the results are reported in Column 3 of Table 10. Overall, the results indicate that total 
debt is significant and positively linked with FP (ROA), and thereby suggesting that our results are not 
affected by endogeneity problems that may be associated with unobserved charity-level characteristics. 
[Insert Table 10] 
Finally, to control for endogeneities that may be associated with potential omitted variables bias, we re-
estimated Model 3 of Table 5 using the 2SLS methodology. Following the same procedures adopted in 
Models 5 and 6 of Table 8, we first conducted the DWH test, to investigate whether there is any endogenous 
link between ROA and TD. DWH test fails to accept the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, indicating that the 
2SLS may be more appropriate than OLS regression. The findings reported in Model 3 of Table 10 remain 
relatively similar to those reported in Table 5, and therefore indicating that the results of the current study 
remain largely unaffected by problems associated with potential omitted variables bias. 
7. Summary and conclusion  
This study examines whether trustee board diversity (TBD) impacts on capital structure (CS), and 
consequently ascertains whether CG can moderate this association. Additionally, we examine the effect of 
CS on charity performance (FP), and consequently examine the potential moderating influence of TBD and 
CG quality on the association between CS and charity FP throughout the period from 2010 to 2014. Our 
study extends, as well as makes a number of new contributions to the current literature. First, we extend and 
contribute to the extant literature by examining the impact of TBD on CS. There is an acute dearth of prior 
research that has investigated the impact of TBD on CS in the charity sector. The findings indicate that 
charities with gender-diverse boards tend to use less debt. However, we also find that trustee board ethnic 
diversity is positively and significantly associated with long-term debt and insignificantly associated with 
short-term and total debt.  
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Second, this study extends, as well as contributes to existing literature by investigating the moderating 
effect of CG quality on the association between TBD and CS. We find that the association between TBD and 
CS has significantly improved, suggesting that charity-level CG quality appears to moderate this association. 
Third, we contribute to extant literature by examining the relationship between CS and FP in charity sector. 
Our results indicate that CS (including long-term, short-term and total debt) has a positive and significant 
association with charity FP, measured by ROA. Fourth, this study extends, as well as contributes to the extant 
literature by examining the potential moderating effect of TBD and CG on the association between CS and 
charity FP. Overall, and consistent with our expectations, we find that the association between CS and FP 
improves considerably in charities with gender/ethnically diverse boards and good CG structures.  
Fifth, our study contributes to the extant literature by examining whether increasing the number of 
women and ethnic minority trustees affect CS. We find that increasing the number of women on trustee 
board to a certain point (u  to 3, which represent about 25% of board members of the average charity 
included in our sample) enhances board decision-making. However, having four or more women on the 
board of trustees can increase conflicts among board members, which may reduce the influence of women in 
the boardroom, which is largely in line with the predictions of critical mass and token status theories. 
Similarly, the study finds no association between the level of trustee board ethnic diversity and CS. Sixth, 
despite increasing theoretical suggestions that adopting a multi-theoretical framework can help in explaining 
the varied reasons determining the choice of CS and the impact of CS on FP, existing studies are either 
descriptive or informed by single theories. Therefore, we contribute to the existing literature by offering new 
insights from agency, resource dependence, stakeholder, legitimacy, pecking order and signalling theories to 
explain the impact of TBD on CS, as well as the effect of CS on charity FP. 
Seventh, the findings of our studies have important implications for charities and stakeholders. With 
reference to charities, the evidence suggests that TBD have a substantial influence on CS. This implies that 
charities may need to pay close attention to this mechanism in order to align the interests of agents (trustees) 
and principals (donors). In terms of stakeholders, the evidence suggests that CS has a significant impact on 
charity FP; hence stakeholders may use CS as indicator when providing finance to charities. Eighth, the 
evidence provided in this paper provides potential empirical and theoretical insights for further future 
studies. In terms of empirical expansions, this paper focused only on the UK, and thus future research can 
extend our study by examining the associations of interests (i.e., questions 1 to 4) in different international 
governance environments (i.e., developing or developed countries). With respect to the theoretical 
expansions, our evidence indicate that future studies may improve their theoretical grounds by using other 
theories, such as stewardship theory, when examining the impact of TBD on CS and also to ascertain 
whether charity FP is influenced by CS. Finally, although the results of this study are robust to alternative 
estimations and models, our study has some limitations, including restricting our analysis to TBD. As data 
becomes available, future studies may consider the impact of other factors, including country levels factors 
(e.g., inflation rate, political situation and macro-economic conditions) on CS. In addition, despite its 
potential strengths, such as increasing degrees of freedom and reducing potential multi-collinearities 
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problems, our use of balanced panel data can result in other sampling problems, such as survivorship bias, 
which needs to be taken into account when interpreting our results. Also, this study has examined the impact 
of CS on charity FP without considering the impact of CS on other outcomes, including trustees’ pay, hence 
future studies can extend our study and contribute to the extant literature by investigating the impact of CS 
on trustees’ pay. Further, the current study has examined the impact of TBD on CS, and consequently 
whether charity FP is related to CS, future studies can enhance our understanding by conducting in-depth 
interviews and qualitative analysis to gain further insights relating to these associations. 
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Table 1 
Financial Data of 30 Charites for 2010 
Charity Name Charity 
Type 
Total 
Income 
(£000) 
Total 
Assets 
(£000) 
Total 
Debt 
(£000) 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(£000) 
 
ActionAid Poverty 65,745 19,065 6,845 1,026 
Arthritis Research UK  Health 36,261 113,488  13,525  24,021 
Autism Initiatives UK Disability 32,246 14,588 5,750 867 
The Charities Aid Foundation Other  377,433 1,854,579 1,074,055 96,096 
Cancer Research UK  Health 514,900 482,100 255,300 77,100 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development Other  49,055 34,827 7,791 7,144 
Cats Protection  Other  34,736 60,836 2,997 7,918 
Church of England Children’s Society Other  40,956 43,168 6,238 9,841 
City and Guilds of London Institute  Education 118,259 102,970 25,291 10,572 
BBC Children in Need Poverty  44,204 83,279 51,873 274,390 
CITB Education  317,448 87,095 54,113 1,095 
Care International UK Poverty  32,509 18,038 6,579 119 
Consumers’ Association Education  70,870 52,748 13,245 21,383 
Crime Reduction Initiatives  Poverty  57,508 20,336 8,760 317 
Dogs Trust Other  60,702 100,862 5,342 17,841 
The Keepers and Governors of the Free 
Grammar  School of John Lyon 
Education  39,957 99,486 22,607 9,217 
Help for Heroes  Other  45,723 56,610 54,404 202 
Historic Royal Palaces  Other  61,792 41,288 9,518 406 
The Royal National Institute for Deaf People Disability  47,258 24,816 3,409 2,308 
International Planned Parenthood Federation Education  87,998 89,006 11,998 466 
SS. John and Elizabeth Charity Health  42,671 41,052 24,270 935 
The Kennedy Trust for Rheumatology Research  Health  62,662 100,921 13,128 2,411 
The Legal Education Foundation  Education  73,113 118,203 24,967 3,393 
Liverpool Hope University Education  52,474 81,746 17,415 12,654 
Learning and Skills Improvement Service Education  147,128 30,298 26,124 720 
The Mines Advisory Group Poverty  31,173 8,847 7,539 1,844 
Macmillan Cancer Support Health  123,394 183,400 113,054 13,406 
The National Autistic Society Disability  88,310 54,743 24,196 3,987 
National Centre for Social Research Education  40,366 21,479 12,264 271 
Nuffield Health  Health  553,100 563,800 293,700 28,200 
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Table 2 
Variables definition and measurement 
Panel A: Capital structure 
LTD Percentage of total long term debt to total assets. 
STD Percentage of total short term debt to total assets. 
TD Percentage of total long and short term debts to total assets. 
Panel B: Trustee board gender diversity 
TGD The proportion of female trustee members to the total number of trustees. 
D_TGD 1 if a charity has at least one woman director on the trustee board, 0 otherwise.  
D1_TGD 1 if a charity has one woman director on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D2_TGD 1 if a charity has two women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D3_TGD 1 if a charity has three women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D4_TGD 1 if a charity has four women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D5_TGD 1 if a charity has five women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D6_TGD 1 if a charity has six women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
D7_TGD 1 if a charity has seven or more women directors on the trustee board, 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Trustee board ethnic diversity 
TED The proportion of non-white or black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) background trustees to the 
total number of trustees. 
D_TED 1 if a charity has at least one non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustee, 
0 otherwise. 
D1_TED 1 if a charity has one non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustee, 0 
otherwise. 
D2_TED 1 if a charity has two non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D3_TED 1 if a charity has three non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D4_TED 1 if a charity has four non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D5_TED 1 if a charity has five non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D6_TED 1 if a charity has six non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background trustees, 0 
otherwise. 
D7_TED 1 if a charity has seven or more non-white or black, Asian and minority ethic (BAME) background 
trustees, 0 otherwise. 
Panel D: Charity performance 
ROA Surplus or total funds generated in the financial period divided by total assets. 
Panel E.1: Control variables (governance mechanisms) 
TSE The total number of trustees in a financial year. 
AFS 1 if a charity is audited by one of the biggest four audit firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
PCGC 1 if a charity has a separate independent CG committee, 0 otherwise.   
TMs Natural logarithm of the frequency of trustee meetings in a financial year. 
Panel E.2: Control variables (charity characteristics) 
LIQ Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
CEX Total capital expenditure scaled by total assets.  
IDU Dummy variables for each of the main five industries. 
YDU Dummy variables for the years 2010-2014. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Capital structure   
LTD (%) 6.64 0.37 10.87 0.04 42.90 
STD (%) 23.63 16.85 20.37 1.10 96.10 
TD (%) 30.27 24.84 21.93 1.10 96.10 
Trustee board diversity 
TGD (%) 30.07 30.77 15.36 0.00 77.80 
TED (%) 4.24 0.00 6.25 0.00 30.00 
Charity performance    
ROA (%) 61.67 66.91 25.91 -34.29 97.72 
Control variables (governance mechanisms)   
TSE (no.) 13.60 12.00 5.17 5.00 30.00 
AFS (%) 40.00 00.00 49.00 00.00 100.00 
PCGC (%) 28.00 00.00 45.00 00.00 100.00 
TMs (no.) 5.13 4.00 1.90 2.00 14.00 
Control variables (charity characteristics)   
LIQ (%) 2.36 1.85 2.34 29.04 0.03 
CEX (%) 10.60 5.68 28.59 -29.57 29.48 
Notes: LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes 
trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee ethnic diversity; ROA denotes return on assets; TSE 
denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the separate independent CG committee; 
TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. Table 2 fully 
defines all the variables used. 
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Table 4 
Spearman and Pearson Correlation Matrices 
Variable LTD STD TD TGD TED TSE AFS PCGC TMs LIQ CEX ROA 
LTD  -.072 .329*** .125** .204*** .003 -.076 -.038 -.120* -.338*** -.144** .182*** 
STD -.118*  .867*** -.105* -.103  .197*** .092 -.274*** -.065 -.175*** .121* .778*** 
TD .386*** .870***  -.089 .032 .164*** .079 -.254*** -.123* -.355*** .061 .837*** 
TGD -.080 -.017 -.055   .246*** .151** .046 -.076 .181*** -.188*** -.049 -.165*** 
TED .255*** -.075 .058 .166***  -.042 .029 .048 -.054 .029 -.258*** .032 
TSE -.042 .234*** .197*** .178*** -.137**  .019 .144** -.133** -.177*** .112* .069 
AFS -.002 .038 .035 .077 .048 .023  -.073 -011 .082 .088 -.096 
PCGC .005 -.194*** -.178*** -.059 .063 .144** -.073  .093 .009 -.037 -.158** 
TMs -.281*** -.014 -.152** .199*** -.071 -.182*** -.101 .070  .099 .106* -.093 
LIQ -.177*** -.228*** -.300*** -.099 .012 -.135** .051 .078 .148**  .099 -.267*** 
CEX -.211*** -.032 -.134** .034 -.140** -.061 .147** -.095 .062 .007  -.025 
ROA .261*** .739*** .816*** -.140** .051 .090 -.072 -.103 -.123* -.238*** -.086  
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficient, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s correlation coefficients. 
Variables are definite as follows: LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes 
trustee ethnic diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee 
meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure; ROA denotes return on assets. ***, ** and * indicate that correlations among variables are significant 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (2-tailed) respectively 
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Table 5  
Effect of trustee board diversity on capital structure 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
LTD 
(1) 
STD 
(2) 
TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
LTD 
(5) 
STD 
(6) 
TD 
(7) 
TD 
(8) 
Trustee board gender diversity:        
TGD -0.048(.234) -0.149(.074)* -0.196(.022)** -3.095(.000)*** - - - - 
Trustee board ethnic diversity         
TED  - - - - 0.231(.015)** -0.100(.616) 0.131(.523) 3.866(.028)** 
Interaction variables:  Governance*TGD       
TGD*TSE - - - 0.603(.012)** - - - - 
TGD*AFS - - - 0.410(.23)** - - - - 
TGD*PCGC - - - -0.131(.550) - - - - 
TGD*TMs - - - 0.800(.001)*** - - - - 
Interaction variables: Governance*TED        
TED*TSE - - - - - - - -1.615(.002)*** 
TED*AFS - - - - - - - 0.294(.555) 
TED*PCGC - - - - - - - -0.246(.622) 
TED*TMs - - - - - - - 0.040(.949) 
Controls: Governance mechanisms        
TSE -3.019(.065)* 17.282(.000)*** 14.261(.000)*** 0.589(.933) -2.746(.088)* 15.634(.000)*** 12.891(.000)*** 19.822(.000)*** 
AFS 0.633(.595) 2.614(.290) 3.260(.200) -10.685(.081)* 0.284(.809) 2.258(.363) 2.556(.318) 0.613(.844) 
PCGC 0.170(.902) -7.828(.007)*** -7.667(.010)*** -1.686(.811) 0.094(.945) -7.012(.015)** -6.928(.020)** -6.024(.087)* 
TMs -6.930(.000)*** 1.235(.761) -5.717(.172) -26.553(.001)*** -7.172(.000)*** -1.124(.774) -8.313(.041)** -9.209(.045)** 
Controls: Charity characteristics       
LIQ -0.480(.059)* -1.910(.000)*** -2.392(.000)*** -2.528(.000)*** -0.463(.066)* -1.830(.001)*** -2.295(.000)*** -2.568(.000)*** 
CEX -0.084(.000)*** -0.003(.950) -0.087(.048)** -0.100(.022)** -0.076(.000)*** -0.006(.896) -0.082(.069)* -0.070(.117) 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 12.704** -72.881*** -60.151*** 9.674*** 9.928*** -69.159*** -59.214*** -75.385 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.646 2.306 2.548 2.589 2.753 2.224 2.452 2.480 
F- value 9.553*** 4.673*** 6.738*** 6.298*** 10.062*** 4.405*** 6.259*** 5.875*** 
Adj. R2 0.345 0.171 0.244 0.277 0.338 0.161 0.228 0.261 
Notes:  LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee board ethnic diversity; 
TG/ED*TSE  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board gender/ethnic diversity and trustee size;  TG/ED*AFS  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board 
gender/ethnic diversity and audit firm size;  TG/ED*PCGC  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board gender/ethnic diversity and  existence of a separate independent CG 
committee;  TG/ED*TMs  denotes the interaction variable between trustee board gender/ethnic diversity and trustee meetings; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; 
PCGC denotes the separate compliance, governance or risk committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Effect of  Capital structure on charity performance 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
ROA 
(1) 
ROA 
(2) 
ROA 
(3) 
ROA 
(4) 
ROA 
(5) 
Capital structure:      
LTD 0.467(.005)*** - - - - 
STD - 0.919(.000)*** - - - 
TD  - - 0.962(.000)*** 1.709(.000)*** 1.732(.000)*** 
Interaction variables: Governance, TGD, TED and TD    
TD*TGD - - - 0.003(.287) - 
TD*TED - - - - -0.013(.082)* 
TD*TSE - - - -0.304(.021)** -0.268(.031)** 
TD*AFS - - - -0.236(.015)** -0.253(.008)*** 
TD*PCGC - - - 0.039(.733) 0.097(.406) 
TD*TMs - - - -0.008(.958) 0.011(.937) 
Trustee board gender and ethnic diversity    
TGD - - - 0.047(.625) - 
TED - - - - -0.368(.167) 
Controls: Governance mechanisms     
TSE 8.574(.038)** -7.683(.009)*** -5.057(.048)** -12.911(.002)*** -12.259(.001)*** 
AFS -2.985(.324) -4.749(.023)** -5.329(.004)*** -12.873(.000)*** -12.299(.000)*** 
PCGC -1.053(.762) 5.690(.019)** 5.634(.009)***  4.412(.327)  6.350(.156) 
TMs -11.614(.019)** -14.319(.000)*** -6.929(.019)** -5.242(.276) -6.048(.204) 
Controls: Charity characteristics    
LIQ -2.101(.001)*** -0.629(.166) -0.109(.790) -0.039(.926) -0.030(.942) 
CEX 0.011(.842) -0.026(.464) 0.055(.091)* 0.033(.335)  0.031(.367) 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 50.636*** 121.844*** 111.978*** 132.669*** 133.559*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.274 2.538 2.469 2.582 2.439 
F- value 4.892*** 29.503*** 41.399*** 30.481*** 30.792*** 
Adj. R2 0.180 0.616 0.694 0.703 0.705 
Notes: ROA denotes return on assets; LTD denotes long-term debt; STD denotes short-term debt; TD denotes total debt.  
The next set of six variables is interaction variable among trustee board gender (TGD) and ethnic (TED) diversity, CG 
mechanism and long-term debt, respectively. TG/ED denotes trustee gender and ethnic diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; 
AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee 
meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Effect of trustee board gender diversity (critical mass) on capital structure 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
TD 
(1) 
TD 
(2) 
TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
TD 
(5) 
TD 
(6) 
TD 
(7) 
High  
(8) 
Low  
(9) 
Trustee board gender diversity:         
TGD - - - - - - - 0.164(.292) -0.852(.001)*** 
D1_TGD -24.832(.000)*** - - - - - - - - 
D2_TGD  - -13.209(.001)*** - - - - - - - 
D3_TGD - - -6.919(.039)** - - - - - - 
D4_TGD - - - -3.552(.230) - - - - - 
D5_TGD - - - - -0.736(.811) - - - - 
D6_TGD - - - - - -0.272(.941) - - - 
D7_TGD - - - - - - 0.434(.916) - - 
Controls: Governance mechanisms         
TSE 19.616(.000)*** 18.046(.000)*** 16.231(.000)*** 14.612(.000)*** 12.950(.001)*** 12.638(.002)*** 12.298(.002)*** 17.562(.001)*** 15.622(.006)*** 
AFS 2.868(.246) 2.514(.315) 3.271(.200) 3.025(.239) 2.726(.288) 2.713(.299) 2.626(.312) 3.665(.211) 4.497(.291) 
PCGC -6.941(.015)** -7.323(.012)** -6.708(.022)** -7.012(.018)** -6.845(.022)** -6.799(.024)** -6.723(.024)** -7.966(.020)** -7.084(.139) 
TMs -3.978(.326) -3.686(.382) -6.217(.135) -7.413(.074)* -8.491(.037)** -8.569(.034)** -8.543(.035)** 8.798(.159) 0.918(.897) 
Controls: Charity characteristics        
LIQ -2.342(.000)*** -2.467(.000)*** -2.293(.000)*** -2.356(.000)*** -2.295(.000)*** -2.290(.010)*** -2.290(.000)*** -5.081(.000)*** -2.145(.002)*** 
CEX -0.085(.047)** -0.084(.054)* -0.081(.067)* -0.088(.049)** -0.088(.051)* -0.087(.052)* -0.086(.054)* -0.109(.006)*** 0.130(.480) 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -55.894*** -65.239*** -62.833*** -59.775*** -55.723*** -55.011*** -54.316*** -115.564*** -53.571*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.568 2.548 2.528 2.514 2.477 2.470 2.467 2.415 2.353 
F- value 7.920*** 7.293*** 6.642*** 6.361*** 6.225*** 6.220*** 6.221*** 9.756*** 2.613*** 
Adj. R2 0.280 0.261 0.241 0.232 0.227 0.227 0.227 0.478 0.165 
Notes: TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; D1_TGD to D7_TGD are dummy variables to represent the level of trustee board gender diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS 
denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are 
between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Effect of trustee board Ethnic diversity (critical mass) on capital structure 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
TD 
(1) 
TD 
(2) 
TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
TD 
(5) 
TD 
(6) 
TD 
(7) 
Trustee board ethnic diversity:       
D1_TED -0.968(.715) - - - - - - 
D2_TED  - -4.267(.315) - - - - - 
D3_TED - - 2.845(.665) - - - - 
D4_TED - - - -4.008(.663) - - - 
D5_TED - - - - -5.235(.599) - - 
D6_TED - - - - - -5.235(.599) - 
D7_TED - - - - - - -5.235(.599) 
Controls: Governance mechanisms       
TSE 12.557(.000)*** 13.028(.000)*** 12.382(.000)*** 12.810(.000)*** 12.892(.000)*** 12.892(.000)*** 12.892(.000)*** 
AFS 2.687(.294) 3.144(.226) 2.568(.317) 3.882(.268) 2.895(.264) 2.895(.264) 2.895(.264) 
PCGC -6.703(.024)** -6.940(.019)** -6.832(.021)** -6.862(.021)** -6.868(.021)** -6.868(.021)** -6.868(.021)** 
TMs -8.783(.032)** -9.011(.027)** -8.134(.051)* -9.101(.032)** -9.220(.030)** -9.220(.030)** -9.220(.030)** 
Controls: Charity characteristics      
LIQ -2.291(.000)*** -2.314(.000)*** -2.243(.000)*** -2.336(.000)*** -2.340(.000)*** -2.340(.000)*** -2.340(.000)*** 
CEX -0.089(.049)** -0.091(.042)** -0.085(.056)* -0.088(.050)** -0.087(.050)** -0.087(.050)** -0.087(.050)** 
YDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -54.202*** -54.716*** -55.117*** -54.739*** -54.766*** -54.766*** -54.766*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 2.479 2.475 2.470 2.455 2.457 2.457 2.457 
F- value 6.233*** 6.319*** 6.238*** 6.238*** 6.247*** 6.247*** 6.247*** 
Adj. R2 0.227 0.230 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 
Notes: TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; D1_TED to D7_TED are dummy variables to represent the level of trustee board ethnic 
diversity; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee 
meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 9  
Additional analyses relating to the effect of trustee board diversity on capital structure 
 
Lagged-Effects 
 
Fixed-Effects 
 
2SLS 
 
Heckman Selection Model 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
 TD 
(1) 
TD 
(2) 
 TD 
(3) 
TD 
(4) 
 TD 
(5) 
TD 
(6) 
 D_TGD 
(7) 
TD 
(8) 
D_TED 
(9) 
TD 
(10) 
Trustee board diversity             
TGD -0.181(.049)** -  -0.199(.019)** -  -2.734(.004)*** -  - -0.196(.022)** - - 
TED - 0.225(.321)  - 0.236(.199)  - 2.864(.318)  - - - 0.095(.641) 
TGD_Ratio - -  - -  - -  -0.019(.961) - - - 
TED_Ratio - -  - -  - -  - - -2.085(.252) - 
LAMBDA - -  - -  - -  - 2.078(.087)* - 83.967(.018)** 
Controls: Governance mechanisms             
TSE 14.461(.000)*** 13.487 (.000)***  -0.796(.850) -0.946(.824)  49.624(.001)*** 20.758(.028)**  0.286(.000)*** 14.261(.000)*** 0.054(.529) 7.086(.094)* 
AFS 3.010(.275) 2.358(.395)  0.834(.764) 1.315(.638)  -92.749(.000)*** 22.774(.523)  0.008(.775) 3.260(.200) 0.011(.862) 1.440(.576) 
PCGC -7.557(.020)** -6.995(.032)**  -7.197(.013)** 7.473 (.010)**  -22.857(.000)*** -8.502(.129)  -0.007(.821) -7.667(.010)*** 0.059(.412) -11.814(.001)*** 
TMs -7.240(.124) -9.390(.040)**  -10.992(.012)** 11.927(.007)***  44.488(.013)** 0.051(.995)  0.185(.000)*** -5.717(.172) -0.207(.039)** 10.213(.243) 
Controls: Charity characteristics            
LIQ -1.844(.001)*** -1.750(.002)***  -1.194(.000)*** -1.292(.000)***  -2.589(.000)*** -2.765(.001)***  -0.002(.719) -2.392(.000)*** -0.001(.919) -2.336(.000)*** 
CEX -0.089(.045)** 0.081(.072)*  0.043(.208) 0.042(.220)  1.483(.044)** -0.043(.751)  0.000(.928) -0.087(.048)** -0.002(.088)* 0.100(.259) 
YDU YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
IDU YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Constant -55.393*** -56.165***  -51.732*** -60.720***  -112.265*** -113.235**  -0.041(.831) -57.608*** 0.626** -99.995*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 1.737 1.772  2.049 2.000  2.168 2.133  2.025 2.180 0.126 2.186 
F- value 5.923*** 5.611***  36.048*** 35.264***  6.493*** 6.259***  8.994(.000)*** 6.738*** 2.377*** 6.340*** 
Adj. R2 0.243 0.231  0.894 0.892  0.223 0.228  0.310 0.244 0.072 0.243 
Notes: TD denotes total debt; TGD denotes trustee board gender diversity; TED denotes trustee board ethnic diversity; TGD_Ratio denotes women ratio;  TED_Ratio denotes ethnic minorities ratio; LAMBDA examines the effect of self-selection 
bias; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital expenditure. . P-values are between 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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 Table 10  Additional analyses relating to the effect of capital structure on financial performance 
 
Lagged-Effects  Fixed-Effects  2SLS 
Dep. Variable 
(Model) 
ROA 
(1) 
 ROA 
(3) 
 ROA 
(5) 
Capital structure:      
TD  0.803(.000)***  1.037(.000)***  0.809(.019)** 
Controls: Governance mechanisms     
TSE -3.534(.297)  -3.858(.128)  -41.050(.001)*** 
AFS -6.315(.010)***  -4.511(.007)***  -28.032(.000)*** 
PCGC 3.999(.162)  -1.544(.377)   66.488(.000)*** 
TMs -8.145(.042)**  -2.343(.377)  -43.687(.000)*** 
Controls: Charity characteristics    
LIQ 0.039(.939)  -0.203(.263)  3.242(.000)*** 
CEX 0.025(.531)  -0.012(.555)  0.650(.000)*** 
YDU YES  YES  YES 
IDU YES  YES  YES 
Constant 108.547***  111.575***  82.165*** 
Durbin-W. Stat. 1.789  2.446  2.085 
F- value 19.761***  140.047***  41.399*** 
Adj. R2 0.551  0.971  0.694 
Notes: ROA denotes return on assets; TD denotes total debt; TSE denotes trustee size; AFS 
denotes audit firm size; PCGC denotes the existence of a separate independent CG 
committee; TMs denotes trustee meetings; LIQ denotes liquidity and CEX denotes capital 
expenditure. P-values are between brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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